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abstract
Networked public service delivery requires attention to 
accountability and implementation in the public interest. Using 
the case of transitional housing in a western US community, we 
review the challenges of goal incongruence between network 
members and the resulting management problems. In addition, 
this case illustrates the role that local governments may play in 
promoting the primacy of one network member over others 
through collaborations, contract arrangements and nonmonetary 
resources and the resulting political and judicial difficulties. The 
complexity of networked service delivery is compounded when 
the individual missions of network members supersede public 
policy goals. In many communities, FBOs, as critical partners 
in a social service delivery network, may face great variation in 
expectations about how their organizational mission/faith relates 
to policy goals. Effective network coordination demands that 
each network partner recognizes and adapts, when appropriate, 
to the differing missions/goals of other network partners. 
However, when public resources are used to bolster the stability 
of alternative service providers, especially faith-based providers, 
governmental partners must maintain adequate oversight, with 
or without the benefit of specific contract provisions.
Keywords: networks, transitional housing, faith-based organizations
introduction
Mosher (1980, 545) called for attention to the “fundamental 
shifts in the purposes, emphases, and methods of federal 
operations” noting that “changes in the content of what the 
government undertakes to have done and in the means by which 
it undertakes to have it done have enormous consequences for 
the content and the means of public administration, the principal 
and indispensable arm of implementation” [emphasis in the 
original]. Despite the increasing delivery of public goods and 
services through businesses or nonprofits, termed ‘government 
by proxy’ (Kettl 1987), ‘shadow government’ (Light 2003; 
Wolch 1990), network governance (Milward and Provan 
2003) or ‘3rd order devolution’(Wineburg, Coleman, Boddie, 
and Cnaan 2008), public administrators, as Mosher forecast, 
must still attend to the efficient and effective implementation 
of public policy. However, as challenging as direct service 
5delivery by government might be, successful implementation is compounded 
in nonhierarchical network arrangements characterized by varying levels 
of formality and fluidity in the power and influence wielded by network 
members. 
Housing policy offers a useful case focus for considering the challenges of 
network service provision. Efforts to develop and provide housing rest with 
the for-profit sector as well as the public and nonprofit sectors. Competitive 
and potentially lucrative opportunities in the private housing market do not 
necessarily offer everyone access to shelter. Nonprofit organizations and 
government have intervened to provide or facilitate affordable and transitional 
housing in communities throughout the United States. Notably, demand for 
social safety net policy such as transitional housing becomes especially critical 
in high growth communities and municipal governments strategically create, 
coordinate, and defer to the variety of transitional housing providers to meet 
demand (Cohen 2001). In transitional housing, like other social services, 
faith-based organizations (FBOs) and other nonprofits offer a tradition of 
service provision and assume a significant role in the web of services available 
to community members. 
Webs of public services provided by a mix of organizations are generally 
termed networks. Though network definitions in public administration 
scholarship vary, Agranoff and McGuire (2001, 676), attributing this 
definition to Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan (1997, 9), suggest that networks 
include “various actors (individuals, coalitions, bureaus, organizations) none 
of which possess the power to determine the strategies of other actors.” 
Agranoff and McGuire further extend the Kickert et al definition by drawing 
upon Mandell (1988) to note “networks are conceived in terms of a cluster of 
organizations, a purposeful whole, rather than as many different organizations 
performing unrelated tasks” (Agranoff and McGuire 2001, 676). Because 
FBOs and nonprofits generally derive their impetus not from government, 
but from their observation about community needs and gaps in assistance, 
considering social service networks must move beyond “situations where 
government officials intentionally engage networks of providers to enhance 
the delivery of public goods” (Goldsmith and Eggers 2004, 10). Thus, we 
consider a broader definition of network in which government may not be 
the catalyst or focus, but may have a significant place in legitimizing member 
providers with a substantive effect upon that provider’s ability to develop 
capacity and to coordinate effectively with other network members. 
Milward and Provan’s hollow state metaphor captures “the devolution of 
power and decentralization of services from central government to subnational 
government and, by extension, to third parties – nonprofit agencies and 
private firms – who increasingly manage programs in the name of the state” 
(2003, 2) and the means by which government cajoles (collaboration) or 
controls (contracting) proxy efforts. We should recognize that while in some 
6policy areas government has not been the impetus for social safety net policy 
– as in the case of long-standing faith-based and secular service delivery – it 
does play a significant role in stabilizing and regulating the service network 
in communities. Whether or not a service provider orchestrates their efforts 
in deliberate consultation with government, the service provider exists in 
a particular service domain. Membership in this network is both self and 
collectively defined and includes those who provide services as well as those 
who influence that provision through regulation, fiscal support or expertise. 
Those actors who are perceived as being legitimate, active and stable 
members could be viewed as having primacy in the network at a given point 
in time. Primacy may shift as members escalate or de-escalate in activity. 
Some network members may lurk in a policy network, without a significant 
delivery role. These members may, however, offer public managers options 
in distributing resources. Because public resources have stability and broad 
legitimacy, then municipal funding, formal contracts, and informal agreements 
to provide technical assistance or other forms of nonmonetary resource may 
offer primacy to a lurking provider and establish that provider as a preferred 
option to citizens in need of help. 
Faith-based orGanizations  
and Public services 
Attention to FBO service delivery requires a historical perspective. In 
providing a useful overview of the devolution of social service programs from 
a federal, government-centric role during the past several decades, Wineburg 
and his colleagues (2008) note that two federal actions are pivotal: Charitable 
Choice and the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community 
Initiatives. ‘Charitable Choice’ provisions in the 1996 welfare reform law, 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), facilitated government 
contracts with FBOs via block grants (Chaves 1999; Kramer et al. 2005). 
These provisions allowed FBOs to compete for federal contracts by exempting 
faith-based organizations that seek federal funding from restrictions in 
hiring based on religious belief or practice. Further, these provisions forbid 
states receiving federal block grant money from requiring that “a religious 
organization ‘alter its form of internal governance’ or ‘remove religious art, 
icons, scripture, or other symbols’ as a condition for contracting to deliver 
services…” (Chaves 1999, 836).
To extend the FBO role beyond ‘Charitable Choice,’ President Bush created 
the Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives in 2002 to “identify 
barriers to participation of faith-based organizations…in government 
contracting” (Kramer et al. 2005, 2). The Office of Faith-Based and 
Community Initiatives intended to “identify and eliminate barriers that 
impede the full participation of FBOs in the federal grants process” (White 
House FBCI 2005). Following the federal lead, several states, including 
7California, Florida, Michigan, Oklahoma and Texas have revised statutes 
and regulations “to make it easier for congregations and religious charities to 
receive government grants to provide social services . . . [and] . . . more than a 
hundred cities have appointed formal liaisons to their local faith communities” 
(Buntin 2004, 34). 
The post-2008 election has not signaled a deviation from this commitment at 
the federal level. In February, 2009, President Obama amended the executive 
order that established the Bush Whitehouse FBO initiative to extend this 
effort under the Office of Faith-based and Neighborhood Partnerships. The 
Obama Whitehouse added content to the executive order emphasizing the 
importance of “preserving our fundamental constitutional commitments 
guaranteeing the equal protection of the laws and the free exercise of religion 
and forbidding the establishment of religion” (Amendments 2009). While 
Smith and Sosin (2001) caution us to consider that FBOs differ significantly 
in terms of the integration of faith with service delivery, administrators 
must consider whether and when the granting of governmental monies to a 
religious organization might comprise a violation of the separation of church 
and state. 
The United States Supreme Court has evaluated this question in a variety 
of cases. DeVita and Wilson (2001) note that while some perceive (and 
prefer) the separation of Church and State to be absolute, there is a long 
history of partnership between religious organizations and governments in 
the United States including federal, state and local support of religiously-
affiliated hospitals, schools and colleges. Recent Supreme Court cases appear 
to have loosened the previous judicially-defined separation of church and 
state by allowing “financial support for secular services on parochial school 
property (Agostini v. Felton 1997) and [to] supply educational materials and 
computers for secular-oriented programs in parochial schools (Mitchell v. Helms 
2000)” (DeVita and Wilson 2001, 2). Further, in Hein v. Freedom from Religion 
Foundation, Inc, a split court expects that differential tests will be applied to 
congressional action establishing religion versus executive branch efforts that 
represent ‘executive discretion.’ While general taxpayer standing is sufficient 
to challenge congressionally directed expenditures that might favor religion, 
the majority opinion on the Court determined that simple taxpayer status is 
not sufficient to challenge matters within the discretionary purview of the 
executive branch. 
The Court has continued to place restrictions on the use of governmental 
money by religious organizations. Scholars note Justice O’Connor’s 
concurring opinion in Mitchell, “government aid violates the Establishment 
Clause if the government can be fairly held responsible for religious 
indoctrination that is supported by public aid” (Lupu and Tuttle 2006). This 
includes the provision that governmental aid “must not be used for specifically 
religious activities, which includes programs with religious content” (Lupu 
8and Tuttle 2006). These activities are generally permitted, however, if argued 
to be either voluntary or separated in time/location from publicly funded 
programs. Unfortunately, in their review of the Charitable Choice provisions 
in the block grant programs, Kramer and her colleagues (2005, 5) note that 
“faith content, separation [of religious activities from secular], and the degree 
to which participation in religious activities is voluntary are not routinely 
monitored.” Because organizational financial and client-based data are the 
only information routinely collected as part of the contract monitoring 
process, governments would learn about “faith expression or problems it 
posed only by happenstance” (Kramer et al. 2005, 5). The challenge of 
balancing the religious mission of the organization with federal rules regarding 
separation of church and state is evident in the following lament from a 
minister: “Watch out. We can’t do it all and they will want us to. Or they will 
tell us we can do what we want ‘but just not call it prayer.’ But that’s what we 
do - pray” (Withorn 2001, 113). 
networks and Fbos: Goals, caPacity  
and coordination
Questions about performance and accountability using government proxies 
to deliver public services are illustrated with Light’s (2003) argument that 
government by proxy may ultimately undermine the public interest in four 
ways – through illusory presumptions about merit, the unified nature of 
public service, capacity and accountability. The reality that people serving the 
public interest may never consider themselves to be a part of government or 
directly responsive to elected officials demonstrates the disparate identity of 
proxies. Of the four, most significant to Light may be the presumptions that 
proxied systems are accountable. 
Advocates of alternative service systems argue that well-defined contract 
arrangements ensure accountability (Brown, Potoski and Van Slyke 
2006; Kettl 2002; Milward and Provan 2003). However, not all network 
relationships are dependent upon contracts and the nature of the contracting 
parties does matter. Warner and Hefetz (2008, p. 158) surmise that “principal 
agent problems are less likely with nonprofit and intermunicipal contracts 
because these organizations have community missions similar to that of 
government.” How can governments ensure that networks involving FBOs as 
service providers are effective and accountable? Not all network relationships 
are characterized by formal contracts in which performance guidelines are 
articulated. Unfortunately, ‘faith’ in the compatibility of missions in proxied 
systems as a mechanism to ensure accountability may be insufficient. As Light 
notes (2003, 167) “one does not have to go too far down the accountability 
chain to find mixed motives, diffused responsibilities, and general confusion 
about who is accountable to whom.” Echoing Frederickson (1997), Light 
9observes that “just because a private firm or nonprofit agency delivers a given 
service . . .does not mean it is excused from worries about the broader public 
good” (2003, 168). 
Determining whether the public good is served by FBOs embedded within 
networks may be methodologically complex when government evaluates 
charitable choice and FBO implementation (Bielefeld 2006; Grettenberger, 
Bartkowski, and Smith 2006). Networks are characterized by multiple 
organizations that may be embedded in different levels or jurisdictions 
of government; represent varied combinations of nonprofit or private 
organizations and professional and volunteer staff. Within any given network, 
organizations may differ in the laws and regulation that apply to them, 
the fiscal years within which they operate, funding sources, administrative 
infrastructure/capacities, and the nature of their missions. Networks require 
entirely different management skills and often depend upon relationships 
that that are informal, cooperative, or at least tolerant, of the efforts of other 
network actors (Gazley 2008). 
Huxham (2003, 405) considers all manner of collaborative effort and 
suggests a major barrier to success is goal incongruence. Network partners 
may differently view goals and may either assume shared purpose with other 
partners or subsume their own organizational mission as an adaptation to 
acquire resources. An entity’s goals may differ from, or even conflict with the 
goals of other members of the network. Corporate members of a network 
are likely to have a clear goal of maximizing their profit from the activity. 
Governmental partners may have goals that are difficult to define or measure 
(Goldsmith and Eggers 2004, 40). Nonprofit organizations may also have 
diffuse goals, and oftentimes have failed to participate in meaningful strategic 
planning to identify their priorities (Wolch 1990; Fredericksen and London 
2000). Faith-based organizations may have as their primary goal a religious 
directive such as conversion of clients and view social services provision as a 
means to pursue that goal (Grettenberger 2004). However, for a network to 
deliver a service successfully, all members will have to reach agreement on the 
policy goals of that particular network. 
Aside from the potential to subvert the public interest by using public funds to 
support constitutionally excluded activities, goal incongruence offers practical 
challenges. Goldsmith and Eggers (2004) suggest that goal incongruence, 
whether overt or subsumed, leads to two main management concerns: 
capacity problems and coordination problems. 
Capacity, and attendant problems, includes areas such as contract oversight, 
staffing, financial systems and the logistical and professional demands of 
service delivery. As governments have increasingly turned to the nonprofit 
sector generally, and FBOs specifically, to provide public services, concerns 
have been raised about the capacity of these organizations to deliver services 
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effectively and in the public interest. Kramer et al noted that “advocates 
and critics alike expressed concern about the ability of many FBOs to meet 
the requirements of government contracting” (2005, 5). Organizational 
financial structures and reporting, staffing structures, governing boards and 
employment practices may all flag capacity deficiencies (Fredericksen and 
London 2000; Keating and Frumkin 2003). Potentially, FBOs have the 
advantage of institutional structure with their associated religious organization 
and may be viewed by government as having greater capacity than small, 
independent, secular nonprofits. Unfortunately, this perception may not be 
accurate within a particular network (Kissane 2007).
Like many nonprofits, FBOs rely heavily upon volunteer staff members. One 
study reported, “only 6% of the nation’s roughly 350,000 congregations have 
a staff person who spends at least half his time on social services” (Buntin 
2004, 36). DeVita and Wilson (2001, 3-4) summarize the difficulties facing 
FBOs who seek grant and contract funding by noting, “in many instances, 
these organizations do not have the capacity to identify funding opportunities, 
write proposals, manage multiple funding streams, report their activities 
to funders, and deliver their social service programs.” The difficulties of 
complying with complicated contract management systems were noted in 
Withorn’s interviews with social welfare workers in the nonprofit sector. 
“One long-time activist put it this way in 2000: ‘We want ‘our people’ who 
live in the community to provide services. But all the contracts make money 
management hard…they pull your contracts if you lack professional staff. And 
then if something bad happens because people weren’t trained properly, or 
paid enough, everyone suffers” (Withorn 2001, 110).
The capacity to develop and monitor the relationships within a network 
is not only an issue for nonprofit organizations. Governments also need 
to adapt their internal structures and operating procedures in order to 
be effective members of a network. Project management, performance 
measurement and oversight, and indirect financial management are among 
the new skill sets required in network governance (Goldsmith and Eggers 
2004; Kettl 2002, 500-501). Organizations develop practices and policies 
to ensure accountability to their own mission and values. The challenge of 
operating within a network is that organizations are forced to adopt a new 
set of practices and policies and integrate the new operational patterns with 
personnel and training functions. These new practices and policies, oriented 
entirely toward maintaining successful relationships with the other members 
of the network, take time to develop and may be inconsistent with existing 
mission and practice. 
Coordination involves challenges related to communication as well as the 
management of relationships among the various network members. Kettl 
(2006) notes that collaboration among a variety of partners requires a different 
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approach than traditional hierarchical models of implementation. Maintaining 
successful relationships with other network members requires skills in 
negotiation and mediation skills (Kettl 2002; McGuire 2006; Thomson and 
Perry 2006). Goldsmith and Eggers (2004) lament communication meltdowns 
in referencing problems derived from personality conflicts or technology gaps 
that might corrode effective communication. 
Constituent communication patterns and preferences add to the coordination 
challenges faced by organization personnel. Each member of the network is 
responsible to its own constituency. Plausibly, each constituency may assume 
their perspective and interpretation is obvious and shared, or may even resist 
or disapprove of the network altogether. A government agency represents 
constituencies as diverse as the clients it serves, the voters that support it 
through their tax monies, the elected officials who monitor its budget and 
its partners in service provision (as a partial list). FBOs can add religious 
constituencies (e.g., congregations, synods, etc.). Nonprofit organizations 
have as constituencies their clients, their donors, their governing boards and 
their service delivery partners (as a partial list). A for-profit corporation has 
constituencies including its shareholders, its customers, and its service delivery 
partners. Each of these constituencies has differing motivations and a different 
expectation about the content and means by which the public interest is 
served.
FBO membership in local service networks is a significant consideration 
for communities regardless of size, geography or constituent demands. As 
conduits of overtly normative social prescriptions, FBOs may anchor (in 
the most positive extreme) or pervert (from the most negative perspective) 
the success of government-by-proxy delivery systems. This becomes most 
significant when the public ‘seal of approval’ is vested with an organization 
through formal and informal arrangements and they assume primacy in a 
service network. The following case of a transitional housing policy network 
in a high growth western community offers an illustration of a policy network 
in which multiple actors with varied relationships to local government 
coordinate and compete to deliver services and influence policy. Government 
played a role in supporting and impeding efforts of different network 
members. Members used varied strategies to influence government and each 
other. Network members were both benefitted and constrained by formal 
contracts. In some cases, government pursued and elevated a relationship 
based on assumptions of capacity despite problems that accrued in clashes 
between public interest and organizational mission. Following the overview 
of the case, we illustrate specific implications of goal incongruence and the 
attendant management problems and reflect upon what might happen when 
government elevates one network member at the expense of others. 
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the transitional housinG network
Figure 1 illustrates the varied membership of the transitional housing network 
in Boise, Idaho. The majority of these entities have financed, influenced 
or provided homeless services in the metropolitan area (with varying 
levels of activity) for decades. In 1994, a formal collaboration between city 
government and a new nonprofit was established to harness and coordinate 
varied transitional housing services offered through a patchwork of agencies, 
secular nonprofits, and faith-based organizations to serve a growing homeless 
population. Boise partnered with Community House, Inc. (CHI) to develop 
a model property for a homeless shelter. The $2.7 million shelter was federally 
funded for the specific purpose of affordable housing, in the form of grants 
to the City and a loan to CHI wherein the City purchased the property and 
CHI handled operations. The 1994 Memorandum of Understanding between 
Boise and CHI specified that the City would provide support to CHI in 
meeting the needs of the homeless population; CHI would lease the facility, 
but that the city would handle maintenance (Lupu and Tuttle 2006; Wylde 
2005). This agreement further specified that if the City had concerns about 
the operation of the facility they were to notify the CHI Board of Directors 
in writing and give the Board 90 days to respond (Wylde 2005). Until 2004, 
the resulting facility, funded with a combination of City support, federal/state 
pass-through monies, and private donations, provided transitional housing for 
homeless and low-income men, women, and families with dormitories for 66 
men, 13 women, and 12 families. The low income housing unit contained 39 
single resident apartments and 10 family units (Hem 2004a, 1).
Beginning around 2000, financial management problems at CHI became 
apparent to the city as “funding decreases led to shelter staff cutbacks, which 
then led to negligence in handling of cash, issuing receipts, filing tax returns 
and other basic financial practices” (Hem 2004a, 1). By 2004, an independent 
audit conducted for the City (the first since 2001) found “missing records, old 
checks that were never claimed, payroll donations to United Way that were 
never given to the charity, tax forms that weren’t filed and poor cash controls” 
(Hem 2005). CHI also began to register compliance problems related to 
HUD regulations. Boise, as the entity receiving the federal grant money, was 
responsible for ensuring compliance. When the city found several instances of 
the shelter failing to comply with regulations, CHI leaders insisted that some 
of the violations were caused by the city’s failure to maintain the building as 
agreed to in an original lease and that multiple agreements developed between 
the City and CHI since 1994 evidenced various distributions of responsibility 
on maintenance and operation between the parties.1
The relationship between CHI and the City deteriorated further due to 
various financial and management concerns ranging from ineffective grant/
fund raising to noncompliance with Fair Housing regulations. In response, 
the CHI Board tightened operations and removed personnel. Boise withheld 
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HUD grant monies (comprising 25% of CHI funding) in 2003/2004 further 
stressing the organization (Hem 2004c, 1). 
In February 2004, Boise began formal action to revoke contractual obligations 
with CHI to run the homeless shelter and in March, 2004, the Salvation 
Army, another network member, entered into an agreement with Boise to 
operate the facility for 3-6 months. Within a month, the Salvation Army 
withdrew citing insufficient fiscal and human resources to address the 
problems they identified at the facility (Hem, 2004c, p. 1). By June 2004, 
CHI was officially removed and control of the facility returned to the City 
(Hem 2004b, 1). Boise attempted to sell the building in July, 2005, but 
abandoned this effort when the only bid they received was from CHI (Hem 
2005, 1). Meanwhile, as early as May 2003, Boise had begun negotiations with 
another potential provider in the network, the Boise Rescue Mission -- nearly 
a year before notifying the CHI board of the City’s intent to seek another 
entity to operate the facility (Wylde 2005). The Rescue Mission’s enthusiasm 
to take over the facility is evidenced by a June 2003 email by its Executive 
Director to the city:
Our Board has asked me to contact you to discover what the next 
step would be to move on the Community House property. We have 
developed a plan for managing the building…and are decided. We want 
to make every effort to acquire the property (Wylde 2005). 
The City temporarily abandoned the effort to sell the shelter and looked for 
an organization to manage the facility. Pursuant to the backroom negotiation 
completed ahead of the request for proposals, the Boise Rescue Mission was 
awarded the contract to run the transitional housing facility in September 
of 2005. Most recently, Boise sold the facility to Boise Rescue Mission 
Ministries in early 2007 for $2 million (Kreller 2007). Market estimates 
suggest that this amount was substantially less than what the City could have 
received for this prime downtown real estate. In addition, the City continues 
to assist the Rescue Mission with favorable terms on sewer-connection fees 
and related infrastructure support. 
Boise Rescue Mission Ministries, a Christian nonprofit organization, holds a 
longstanding presence in the Boise transitional housing network, previously 
operating two privately subsidized, single gender shelters, the Boise Rescue 
Mission for men and City Light Home for women. The Boise Rescue 
Mission Ministries also operates two other properties in Nampa, Idaho 
(Community House, Inc. v City of Boise 2007). 
Boise Rescue Mission Ministries includes religious activities as a core part of 
their homeless shelter operation. Their goal is to “’help people at the physical 
and spiritual points of need’ by providing, among other assistance, ‘Christian 
teaching’” (Community House, Inc. v City of Boise 2007). Among the religious 
activities held in the shelter is a sixty-minute Christian chapel service. 
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Another longstanding Mission policy is to segregate “men and women into 
different facilities, and to segregate homeless singles from homeless families” 
(Community House, Inc. v City of Boise 2007). So, upon beginning operations 
in September 2007, the Mission immediately designated the facility (renamed 
‘River of Life’) as male-only and relocated women and children. The relocated 
female and low-income residents were notified of the new policy in August of 
2005, one month before the formal transfer of the facility to the Boise Rescue 
Mission Ministries. The City covered the relocation expenses for the displaced 
residents (Brusse 2006). 
Refusing to fade into the network, CHI filed a lawsuit in U.S. District 
Court alleging 1) the City’s contract with the Boise Rescue Mission violates 
the Fair Housing Act prohibitions on gender discrimination, and 2) Boise 
Rescue Mission’s religious services, held in the shelter with attendance by 
shelter residence required, violates the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution (Community House, Inc. v City of Boise 
2007). In December 2005, the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho 
ordered the Boise Rescue Mission to stop requiring shelter residents to attend 
worship services. Declining to require that women and children be allowed 
to return to the facility, the District Court did find that the former residents 
of Community House could not be relocated near the residences of registered 
sex offenders (Community House, Inc. v City of Boise 2007; Hughes 2006). Not 
content with a partial victory, CHI appealed to the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals. In November 2006, a panel of the Appeals Court affirmed the 
District Court’s position noting that the City and the Boise Rescue Mission 
must explain why gender discrimination “is necessary and justified” (Hughes 
2006). Further, the Appeals Court, reiterating the lower court’s order not 
to require attendance at religious services, also noted that even voluntary 
religious services in a government-funded building violated the Establishment 
Clause (Hughes 2006). Boise’s subsequent petition for rehearing by the full 
9th Circuit Court of Appeals was denied (Community House, Inc. v City of Boise 
2007). 
In addition to the lawsuit, 15 separate discrimination complaints against the 
Boise Rescue Mission have been filed with the U.S. Department of Housing 
and Urban Development by the Intermountain Fair Housing Council (Brusse 
2006). All of the complaints allege religious discrimination, several allege 
sex discrimination based on the male-female separation policy of the Rescue 
Mission, others concern allegedly invasive searches of female residents and 
perceptions that they had to participate in chapel to receive services (Brusse 
2006). While HUD dismissed most complaints by the end of 2007, the 
Idaho Fair Housing Council filed another suit in federal court on May 9, 
2008 alleging that two individuals were forced to participate in religious acts. 
Interestingly, the fair housing specialist for the Intermountain Fair Housing 
Council is the former director of CHI, the nonprofit organization that ran the 
homeless shelter before the Boise Rescue Mission.
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lessons From a transitional housinG 
network
In the following discussion, we consider goal incongruence and the resulting 
management concerns in particular relation to a network incorporating FBOs. 
Goal incongruence
The central challenge inherent in this case relates to the disparate goals of the 
organizations involved. Boise, a general-purpose unit of government, faces 
homelessness as only one of many pressing issues. CHI, like many nonprofit 
organizations, was formed for single-purpose action to address homelessness 
and was ill-prepared for the compliance requirements associated with public 
funding. Boise Rescue Mission Ministries is a Christian organization whose 
primary goal is creating spiritual change in its clients through the provision of 
social services. While governments hold the separation of church and state as 
a value, the goal of the Boise Rescue Mission is not to separate their service 
provision from the spiritual mission, but rather to integrate service and mission. 
Another issue related to the differing goals of government and FBOs in 
this case concerns the effect of the Rescue Mission’s religious practices on 
shelter clients. Appearing not to have anticipated how the Mission’s goal to 
integrate the spiritual and service provision activities might affect services, 
the City was forced to defend, unsuccessfully, their decision to shift from one 
network member to another. As in this case, many government agencies have 
no effective mechanisms for monitoring whether providers are appropriately 
separating religious and secular activities (Kramer et al. 2005). The complaints 
against the Boise Rescue Mission include allegations of requiring clients to 
worship before receiving services and preferential treatment for those who 
attend worship services. Further, the worship services are held in the same 
facility as the shelter. Although the facility was owned and maintained by the 
City during the initial court challenge, its subsequent sale to Boise Rescue 
Mission does not negate conflict with the establishment clause (Community 
House, Inc. v City of Boise 2007) as even voluntary services violate the 
establishment clause. The court’s findings in this case seem to be in conflict 
with both Bush and Obama White House guidelines lauding voluntary 
religious activities as entirely permissible. Whether the City of Boise neglected 
to address these issues in their contract development or simply failed to 
monitor the practices in the shelter afterwards, it is clear that the Rescue 
Mission’s actions have made the City vulnerable to legal action. 
Coverage of the Mission’s rationale for separating genders in transitional 
housing, and the City’s accommodation of this policy, is beyond the scope of 
this paper. However, sex discrimination is clearly incompatible with the public 
interest. This discrimination, however rationalized by the Mission’s policy 
and city compliance, suggests that the goal of the FBO in this case corrodes 
government goals of equal protection, fairness, and equity. 
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An important dimension to this case is the primacy afforded the Boise Rescue 
Mission with the dethroning of CHI. With the initial contract to operate the 
shelter property – the property conceived in 1994 by local government and 
network members as the model that lead the existing haphazard transitional 
housing network - and the subsequent subsidized sale of the property along 
with favorable terms for expensive utility connections, the City of Boise 
championed Boise Rescue Mission’s place in the network. Withorn notes 
that when money flows to faith-based organizations there is a danger of “the 
inevitable lessening of options for the many people who cannot abide overly 
faith-based environments” (2001, 114). Allegations in the most recent suit 
against the Boise Rescue Mission note that when an individual, ordered by 
the courts to participate in a treatment program at the shelter, requested a 
nonreligious environment, she was told that “because she had not ‘opened her 
heart’ to Christianity her only option was to go back to jail” (Boone 2008).
capacity
Managing effectively in a network requires that all parties have sufficient 
capacity. The management of the contractual relationships is a central tenet 
to successful network management (Kettl 2006) and several important 
contract management issues contributed to problems experienced by Boise 
City in response to its homeless. These issues led to legal challenges. Neither 
the city nor CHI established conditions necessary to the success of their 
original homeless shelter contract. First, critical elements1 of the management 
contracts, including who would have ultimate responsibility for various parts 
of the facility’s upkeep, were neither clarified in advance nor consistently 
maintained in year-to-year memoranda of agreement and contracts. The 
City’s role as both owner of the facility and overseer of compliance with HUD 
grant funding regulations led to role conflict and confusion. Second, the City 
did not maintain adequate financial oversight of CHI administration of the 
homeless shelter. At least a four year period lapsed between financial audits 
done by the City (Hem 2004a). Third, the City, not perceiving the need for 
technical assistance to CHI, offered little guidance in helping the nonprofit 
conform to complicated federal regulations and requirements (Watson 2004) 
despite scholars’ contention that government contractors must maintain the 
resources necessary to monitor contracts (Milward and Provan 2003; Sclar 
2000). In this case, it appears that the City did not have adequate resources 
dedicated to the contract oversight.
The organizational capacity of the nonprofit organizations involved in this case 
offers additional lessons. CHI suffered from the common nonprofit pitfall of 
an inadequate financial and accounting system (Keating and Frumkin 2003). 
Episodic downturns in funding led to staff turnover and a loss of expertise 
and continuity (Hem 2004a, 1). The Board of Directors, comprised of 
volunteers with a passion about housing the homeless, was by turns inattentive 
or overwhelmed by the complexity of the problems and challenges facing 
1   information is drawn from 
“Points of consideration re: 
community house” provided 
by Deanna Watson, former 
chair of the Board of Directors 
for community house, inc as 
an email attachment to the 
second author in January 2007
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CHI and surprised by the heavy fundraising responsibilities (Watson 2004). 
Despite the well-documented importance of adequate training and support for 
nonprofit boards (Houle 1997; Heimovics, Herman, and Jurkiewicz Coughlin 
1993), the CHI board received little orientation or training. The Salvation 
Army confronted its own capacity gaps when it backed out of its agreement 
to manage the shelter after a short time at the helm. Boise Rescue Mission 
Ministries, though appearing to have greater capacity to manage the shelter 
facility, had difficulty meshing its Christian ministries focus into government 
expectations regarding church and state separation.
coordination
Managing relationships among partners in a service delivery network requires 
different skills than those needed in the clear, hierarchical organization that is 
best suited to traditional accountability models (Goldsmith and Eggers 2004). 
Each member of the network must devote time and effort to maintaining 
the horizontal relationships with every other member of the network. Their 
differing organizational cultures and staff/volunteer backgrounds complicated 
coordination between the City and the non-profits charged with running 
the homeless shelter. CHI was founded and partially run by advocates for 
the homeless who had little experience or desire to navigate complex public 
reporting requirements. The deterioration in the relationship between the 
City Council and the CHI Board of Directors is highlighted in the Chair’s 
comments to the Boise Council (Watson, 2004):
If we have lost credibility, if we are viewed simply as a bunch of radicals 
who ran Community House into the ground, then certainly your 
conclusion will be that the sooner we are gone the better. But what if we 
are a group of reasonable people who was engaged in doing what needed 
to be done? What if we did the best we could, that anybody could with 
the resources, the partnerships and the time that we had?
 Many studies have found that trust is a critical component of collaborative 
relationships such as those found in service delivery networks (Thomson and 
Perry 2006). In the absence of trust, relationships will sour. This appears to 
be the situation in this case. Based upon published news reports, it seems 
clear that once the working relationship between Boise and CHI began to 
erode, the City appears to have worked to subvert the collaboration with CHI. 
Boise began negotiations with Boise Rescue Mission more than a year before 
officially notifying CHI of its concerns over the homeless shelter’s operation. 
These actions were taken in spite of clauses in the original contract that 
required the City to notify CHI of their concerns and allow a reply from the 
Board. The premature, secret negotiations of the contract with Boise Rescue 
Mission casts doubts on the credibility of the network collaboration or the 
contract review process undertaken by the City to designate Boise Rescue 
Mission for shelter operations. Finally, the City’s decision to withhold HUD 
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grant monies that had previously comprised 25% of CHI revenues corroded 
that entity’s financial capacity. In this case, it appears that Boise sabotaged 
the CHI contract. Though scholars suggest that trust is critical in a successful 
network (Goldsmith and Eggers 2004; Milward and Provan 2003), in this 
case, trust had clearly broken down as the communication and coordination 
of the partners in the network failed. Further, active network entities who 
fell outside a specific contractual arrangement still played an important role 
in the success of the entire service delivery network. Although the Salvation 
Army and the Boise Rescue Mission were not formal partners in the homeless 
service delivery network contractually, they were important players in how 
those services were conceived and eventually delivered –they had influence. 
Networks are larger than only those partners who have contractual or financial 
linkages and latent players with the potential to assume primacy do matter 
in providing options – whether or not those entities are congruent with the 
public interest. Despite CHI being relegated to a lesser, latent role in the 
network by the City’s actions, they clearly continue to influence the network 
with their legal challenges to FBO service provision.
conclusion
The case of Boise’s experience with transitional housing serves as a 
troubling example of the difficulties inherent in a service delivery network. 
Boise’s experience is not unique. Expanded use of FBOs highlights several 
implementation challenges to networks that transcend the already significant 
complexity of these nonhierarchical arrangements. Scholars are clearly 
attending to network management and well-considered recommendations are 
growing in this literature (Goldsmith and Eggers 2004; Kettl 2002; Milward 
and Provan 2003; O’Toole and Meier 2004). Effective management of the 
network requires that each of the members understands and adapts to the 
differing missions and goals of each of the other member organizations. This 
includes nonprofit recognition of the more rigorous compliance expectations 
that must be held when receiving public funds as in the case of CHI. 
However, moving to FBOs doesn’t ‘lessen’ the need for public oversight. 
In many cases, it may require substantive action for FBOs to address fiscal 
or equity compliance or change religious activities to meet separation of 
church and state standards. In the end, all members of a service delivery 
network must create new kinds of capacity and emphasize coordination to 
be effective partners. While the capacity for a nonprofit to administer and a 
government agency to oversee is important, communication and negotiation 
skills must be sufficient to coordinate network member responses to difficult 
social problems. In this case, capacity was used as a rationale to shift network 
primacy from CHI, a secular nonprofit facing administrative challenges to 
the Salvation Army and then to the Boise Rescue Mission, two FBOs latent 
in the transitional housing network. While the Salvation Army declined 
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primacy after considering the reality of needed capacity, the Boise Rescue 
Mission assumed primacy with confidence in its capacity to deliver coupled 
with public subsidy of operations. However, as we see from this case, the 
technical capacity to deliver services might be compromised because of 
goal incongruence. Does government turn to any organization that has 
the administrative capacity in a network without regard to whether goal 
incongruence might jeopardize the public interest? 
Implementing Housing Policy in Boise, Idaho
These entities, specific to housing, are among the resources named by the 
City of Boise in its 2007 Action Plan submitted to the U.S. Department 
of Housing and Urban Development to maintain eligibility for transitional 
housing support from programs including the Community Development 
Block Grant, Home Investment Partnerships Program, Housing 
Opportunities for People with AIDS program, Emergency Shelter Grants 
Program and the American Dream Down-Payment Initiative. The majority 
of these entities have been participants in regional transitional housing activity 
(with varying levels of activity, latency and primacy) for decades.
Federal
U. S. Department of housing and Urban 
Development
U.S. Department of health and human Services
Federal housing administration homeownership 
Fannie mae
state of idaho
housing and Finance 
administration








inter-faith Sanctuary housing Services




idaho association of mortgage Brokers
ada county association of realtors
Neighborhood reinvestment corporation
el-ada community action agency
capital city Development corporation
Women’s and children’s alliance
Boise Valley habitat for humanity
idaho community Foundation
intermountain Fair housing council
Washington Group international corporation Foundation FiGure 1
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